Summary of In re Steven Daniel P., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 73 by Logan, Geordan G.
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
10-3-2013
Summary of In re Steven Daniel P., 129 Nev. Adv.
Op. 73
Geordan G. Logan
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Logan, Geordan G., "Summary of In re Steven Daniel P., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 73" (2013). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 56.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/56
In re Steven Daniel P., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 73 (Oct. 3, 2013)1 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: JUVENILE COURT AUTHORITY 
Summary 
The Court determined two issues: (1) whether the juvenile court has authority under NRS 
62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision 
pursuant to NRS 62C.200 without the written approval of the district attorney; and (2) whether 
the juvenile court's discretion in overseeing a juvenile matter is limited by the authority granted 
under the Nevada Revised Statutes. 
Disposition 
The juvenile court’s authority under NRS 62C.230(1)(a) permits it to dismiss a petition 
and refer a juvenile for informal supervision only when the requirements of NRS 62C.200 have 
been met, including the requirement that the district attorney give written approval for placement 
of the juvenile under informal supervision where the acts alleged in the petition would be a 
felony or gross misdemeanor if committed by an adult. Furthermore, the provisions of NRS Title 
5 limit the juvenile court’s discretionary power to carry out its duties in overseeing juvenile 
justice matters.  
Factual and Procedural History 
In September 2011, the state charged Steven P., a juvenile, with burglary (a felony) and 
conspiracy to commit burglary (a gross misdemeanor). In January 2012, the juvenile court 
accepted a plea agreement that dismissed the burglary allegation in exchange for Steven 
admitting the conspiracy allegation. Based on the report of a probation officer assigned to 
Steven, the State requested that Steven be made “a delinquent ward of the court” and placed on 
formal probation. Concerned with ordering formal probation, the court reserved ruling on the 
State’s petition. 
Approximately one month later, no decision had been made. In the State’s resulting 
motion for adjudication, the State indicated that Steven’s charges could be deferred and 
dismissed upon his successful completion of probation. Furthermore, “the State contended that 
pursuant to NRS 62C.200-.230, deferred adjudication required approval from the district attorney 
prior to the juvenile court allowing informal supervision.” 
The juvenile court did not obtain the district attorney’s written approval prior to 
dismissing the State’s petition and referring Steven for informal supervision. The juvenile court 
interpreted NRS 62C.230(1)(a) as not requiring such approval. The State now appeals the 
juvenile court’s order.  
                                                
1 By Geordan G. Logan 
Discussion 
The juvenile court does not have authority under NRS 62C.230(1)(a) to dismiss a delinquency 
petition and refer a juvenile for informal supervision without the written approval of the district 
attorney 
The issue here of the juvenile court’s authority pursuant to NRS 62C.230(1)(a) is a matter 
of statutory interpretation, and is therefore subject to de novo review.2 Statutory interpretations 
must be rooted in a statute’s plain meaning as indicated by the statute’s express language “unless 
it is clear that the plain meaning was not intended.”3 The Court will “avoid statutory 
interpretation that renders language meaningless or superfluous.”4 Further, the Court will enforce 
the statute as written where the statute’s language is clear and unambiguous.5  
NRS 62C.230(1)(a) 
NRS 62C.230(1)(a) states that “[i]f the district attorney files a petition with the juvenile 
court, the juvenile court may . . . [d]ismiss the petition without prejudice and refer the child to 
the probation officer for informal supervision pursuant to NRS 62C.200.”6 The term “pursuant 
to” serves as a restrictive term in this construction. Hence, the Court concluded that under the 
plain language of NRS 62C.230(1)(a), “the juvenile court may dismiss the State’s petition and 
refer a juvenile for informal supervision only upon the juvenile court’s determination that the 
requirements of NRS 62C.200 have been met.” 
NRS 62C.200 
“NRS 62C.200 includes preconditions for a juvenile to be placed under informal 
supervision of a probation officer.” This list includes a requirement that “the district attorney 
gives written approval for placement of the child under informal supervision, if any of the acts 
alleged in the complaint are unlawful acts that would have constituted a gross misdemeanor or 
felony if committed by an adult.”7 From the “plain language” of this statute, the Court concluded 
that such written approval is required.  
Furthermore the Court concluded that where NRS 62C.100(1) uses the restrictive term 
“pursuant to NRS 62C.200” to outline a probation officer’s responsibilities in placing a child 
under informal supervision, it is not to be construed as requiring the probation officer, rather than 
the juvenile court, to obtain such written approval. To ensure that the requirements of NRS 
62C.200 have been met, NRS 62C.100(1) cannot be read as extinguishing the harmony between 
                                                
2 State v. Eric A.L. (In re Eric A.L.), 123 Nev. 26, 31, 153 P.3d 32, 35 (2007) (holding that statutory interpretations 
are subject to de novo review). 
3 Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 128 Nev. __, __, 287 P.3d 305, 315 (2012). 
4 Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. __, __, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). 
5 George J. v. State (In re George J.), 128 Nev. __, __, 279 P.3d 187, 190 (2012). 
6 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62C.230(1)(a) (2013) (emphasis added). 
7 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62C.200(1)(b) (2013) (emphasis added). 
the sections of the statute. “To hold otherwise would render the restrictive language in NRS 
62C.230(1)(a) meaningless.” 
NRS 62C.230(1)(b) does not eliminate the requirement of written approval from the district 
attorney 
That NRS 62C.230(1)(b) expressly states that the juvenile court is required to obtain the 
approval of the district attorney, while NRS 62C.230(1)(a) has instead a restrictive reference to 
NRS 62C.200 is of no consequence in determining the need for the juvenile court to obtain the 
district attorney’s approval. “NRS 62C.230(1)(a) refers to, and thus incorporates the statutory 
language of, NRS 62C.200.” Thus the juvenile court must comply with the provisions of NRS 
62C.200 in order to exercise its authority under NRS 62C.230(1)(a). “A statute by reference 
made a part of another law becomes incorporated in it and remains so as long as the former is in 
force.”8 
The juvenile court’s authority is statutorily limited 
The Court reiterated its previous holding that “the juvenile court system is a creation of 
statute, and it possesses only the jurisdiction expressly provided for it in the statute.”9 This 
assertion is further supported by NRS 62B.010(4) which maintains that “a judge of the juvenile 
court has all the powers and duties set forth in this title,” and NRS 62B.300(2), states that the 
juvenile court must exercise its “jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of” Nevada’s Juvenile 
Justice Code. Consequently, “the juvenile court’s discretion to dismiss the State’s delinquency 
petition and refer Steven for informal supervision was expressly limited by statute.” Therefore, 
the Court concluded that “the juvenile court exceeded its statutory authority here.” 
Conclusion 
The juvenile court cannot usurp NRS 62C.200’s requirement that the district attorney 
provide written approval before a juvenile charged with what would be a felony or gross 
misdemeanor if committed by an adult can be placed under the informal supervision of a 
probation officer. Additionally, the provisions of NRS Title 5 statutorily limit the juvenile 
court’s exercise of authority in overseeing juvenile justice matters. The Court reversed the 
juvenile court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the 
opinion. 
 
                                                
8 State ex rel. Walsh v. Buckingham, 58 Nev. 342, 349, 80 P.2d 910, 912 (1938). 
9 State v. Barren, 128 Nev. ___, ___, 279 P.3d 182, 184 (2012). 
